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For the Record - Media as Nomoi
Abstract
Scena. We are experiencing an explosion of recording (Ferraris 2015), which generates a proliferation of
ontological and epistemological dimensions. For instance, our life here and now and our life in the datasphere
(what we buy, when and why we were at the hospital, when we travel and with whom, etc.) today constitute
two parallel dimensions intersecting and reciprocally defining each other (Floridi 2014). There is one Dr. AC
buying milk, standing in front of a supermarket fridge on that date in that place, and there is one Dr. AC
inhabiting the web through her publications, her visiting fellowships, and in the organisation of events, plus
there is a patient, a mother, a daughter, etc. (the list made by John Searle is usually pretty long and contains all
the functions we can have in the social world): the more that is recorded, the more can be traced back, and the
more what we appear to be depends on how easily a datum can be found, iterated, re-interpreted. Technology,
more than ever, is permanently producing and filling in a universal - almost infinite - archive, where
information, transactions, communications (emails, telephone conversations, chats), intentions, mistakes and
various other forms of human existence and traceability are contained.
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol22/iss1/2
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Angela Condello
1  Theme and Vocabulary
Scena. We are experiencing an explosion of recording (Ferraris 2015), 
which generates a proliferation of ontological and epistemological 
dimensions. For instance, our life here and now and our life in the 
datasphere (what we buy, when and why we were at the hospital, 
when we travel and with whom, etc.) today constitute two parallel 
dimensions intersecting and reciprocally defining each other (Floridi 
2014). There is one Dr. AC buying milk, standing in front of a 
supermarket fridge on that date in that place, and there is one Dr. AC 
inhabiting the web through her publications, her visiting fellowships, 
and in the organisation of events, plus there is a patient, a mother, a 
daughter, etc. (the list made by John Searle is usually pretty long and 
contains all the functions we can have in the social world): the more 
that is recorded, the more can be traced back, and the more what we 
appear to be depends on how easily a datum can be found, iterated, 
re-interpreted. Technology, more than ever, is permanently producing 
and filling in a universal - almost infinite - archive, where information, 
transactions, communications (emails, telephone conversations, chats), 
intentions, mistakes and various other forms of human existence and 
traceability are contained.1 Usually, this explosion of recording is 
considered as the reason for a great revolution in the field of privacy 
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and thus in the definition of the difference between the private and the 
public dimension of human life. I shall try to add another perspective 
on this, which I consider crucial for legal discourse: indeed, I shall 
address this great transformation, following the most recent works of 
Maurizio Ferraris (who elaborates on Derrida’s philosophy of traces 
and archi-writing), from the perspective of the responsibility produced 
by these huge, universal and almost infinite archives. That is to say, 
I will try to show that, first, without technology there would be no 
normativity; and, second, that technology itself has its own capacity to 
produce responsibilities and obligations. New media certainly convey 
information through recordings - for this reason, though they are 
usually referred to as IT, information technology, Maurizio Ferraris 
insists on the fundamental function of recordings in the way new 
technologies influence our life. What matters is not, in other words, 
the fact that data, emails or online transactions contain information 
that could (and often is) used otherwise; what matters is, instead, that 
all this remains, and keeps existing (as a kind of data-storage) because 
it is traced down on devices that are constructed as archives. In 1967, 
Derrida had foreseen the ‘end of books’ as means of communication 
and of preservation of knowledge; yet, at the same time, he had 
foreseen a new explosion of writing: his view was certainly prophetic 
to this extent, since computers, the web and the contemporary universe 
of communication constitute a mainly written dimension, in which the 
devices of recording multiply and in which, thus, traces proliferate also 
independently of the will or intentions of individual subjects (Ferraris 
2011: 15; Ferraris 2015, 2018).
Proscenium. There are a number of key-concepts often occurring 
in the earlier as well as in contemporary ref lections on how a 
grammatological view of the world could inf luence a different 
perspective on how we perceive language, communication and 
normativity. The meaning of these concepts must be deconstructed 
in order to be re-used today: (a) nomos, a word that means ‘law’ or 
‘custom’. The word originally translated the concept of law in ancient 
Greeek thought. Currently, ‘norm’ indicates a proposition that contains 
an obligation. (b) Grammata: signs, traces: that which is written, that 
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which is drawn and traced down. (c) Inscriptio: from in plus scribere. To 
write in or to write on something. (d) Record: the act of repeating, or 
to reiterate; rehearse, repeat and report by heart. From Latin recordari: 
remember, call to mind, think over, be mindful of. Integration of 
re-, restore and cor (genitive cordis), heart - as the metaphoric seat of 
memory. (e) Technologìa: a word composed by the terms ‘tèchne’, that 
means art or technique, a way of making things and/or the knowledge 
about how to make things; and logìa, deriving from logos: discourse, 
treaty (itself deriving from lego, which means speaking, describing). 
The composition of these two terms into technologìa indicates a doctrine 
of how to apply the rules, the knowledge about how to make things.
Through a progression going from the trace, to the document, and 
finally to the archive, the ambivalence and double bind between presence 
and absence is the underlying theme characterizing both Derrida’s theory 
of grammatology and of the force of law, on the one hand, and Maurizio 
Ferraris’s works on new technologies and mobilisation , on the other. In 
both philosophical systems (as in Plato’s Phaedrus), the act of writing 
is aimed at inscribing something that otherwise would disappear: 
recording guarantees the possibility of presence and preserves the 
temporality of an event, of an act, of a contingent proposition  beyond 
its contingency. Writing is first and foremost a technique, a tèchne, an 
ars: a procedure that implies the capacity of crafting something that 
is not there and of extending the duration of a contingent act or fact 
beyond its contingency. Inasmuch as the archive, as Goodrich recalls in 
his paper,2 ‘attempts an accurate description of what did not occur’ 
(Goodrich 2018), Phaedrus (the protagonist of the Platonic dialogue) 
needs the written version of the discourses he has heard (which he hides 
under his cloak) since he is afraid of forgetting them; similarly, we are all 
obsessed with being present: to the extent that new technologies allow 
us to be everywhere at anytime precisely because we are afraid of being 
absent, here and now and also there and then, and more generally since 
we are afraid of death. Cornelia Vismann wrote that the archive refers 
to that which does not speak and keeps what otherwise would get lost 
(Vismann 2008); in a similar way, a norm contained in the text of a 
law is a norm that otherwise would not exist as norm and would not be 
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respected. Inscriptions stand to make things enduring and contextually 
remind us that otherwise things (norms, messages, orders, love letters) 
would be ephemeral. Because that is what they are: ephemeral. Just 
like life itself. No wonder that the philosopher of textuality, traces and 
grammatology par excellence was afraid of death (Ferraris 2011). Nomoi 
must be inscribed, codified, in order to exist and persist as such. Thus, 
the whole history of juridical normativity is a history of codification, 
of transcription of intentions on a limited piece of material that could 
be found, interpreted and accessed.
Today’s technological revolution thus amplifies an archaic drive: 
tracing down not to forget. It also shows that such a drive is ambivalent: 
for something to exist, there must be trace of it; once it is traced down, 
the device on which it is inscribed also informs the way it circulates 
and it is understood. 
A  Circularities
Ambivalence is thus a crucial characteristic of writing. A proposition 
stands there to remind us that otherwise we would forget its content. 
A law indicates that otherwise our behaviour would not follow the 
normative content of a certain proposition, that we follow just because 
it is law (Derrida 1992). The ambivalence of writing and its double 
bind with memory and forgetting, thus, resembles the ambivalence 
of the juridical pharmakon, which stands to remind us that – if it was 
not there – we would need it. In both double binds, the relationship 
between presence and absence is the engine, the force that moves the 
dynamic. The double and ambivalent relationships between writing 
and its content, and between the law and its content, involve a circular 
movement. The ambivalence (the sign is necessary but then it ends 
up hiding something or meaning something else) is related to the 
instrument which records and preserves the content.
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Figure 1. Circular movement in which the three poles, nomos, grammata 
and technology, interact.
We can understand the ambivalence better by imagining a circular 
movement in which three poles interact (see Figure 1). 
Pole one. Nomos - Grammata. In order for something to exist 
socially and to produce consequences, it must be inscribed. This is 
true in particular in the legal realm, as Derrida noted (Derrida 1992). 
Following the principle that nothing exists outside of the text, Derrida 
notoriously analysed the English expression ‘to enforce the law’. When 
talking about this expression, Derrida claims, one:
loses the direct or literal allusion to the force that comes from within 
to remind us that law is always an authorised force, a force that justifies 
itself or is justified in applying itself, even if this justification may be 
judged from elsewhere to be unjust or unjustifiable. Applicability, 
or what we term 'enforceability', is not an exterior or secondary 
possibility that may or may not be added 'as a supplement to law' 
(Derrida 1992: 5). 
Pole two. Grammata - Technology. Signs, traces, documents and 
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archives do not float in the atmosphere. The materiality of the traces is 
crucial: without it, the trace would only be a mere sign. A determined 
material life on a determined type of device (for instance, a code that 
contains laws) attributes to the sign the status of a qualified trace, 
capable of producing consequences. The technology plays a central 
role because without it, there would be no inscription and thus no 
normative force. Ferraris explains it clearly (Ferraris 2009; 2015), 
first in his work on documentality, then in his more recent work on 
documediality. He writes:
The documedial revolution is a technological, social and anthropological 
revolution. It has indeed been possible thanks to the constructive 
force of documentality in conjunction with the communicative and 
mobilizing power of the web. It is a connection of documents and 
media that has involved a very large number of people, in a completely 
unexpected way. Therefore, it is anthropological because it directly 
concerns human beings, modifies their lifestyle in more than one way 
and at the same time highlights some essential human characteristics; 
it is social because it is given in the social world at the base of which 
there is documentality; it is technological because it is triggered by 
the strength and peculiarity of the web (Ferraris and Martino 2018)3.
Ferraris bases his claims on documentality, at f irst, and on 
documediality, more recently (after the explosion of the web and of 
technology 4.0), on two strong theses: i. social reality is constituted 
by recording, and what is not recorded does not exist; ii. recording 
is normative. As a matter of fact, traces produce responsibility: once 
I know a message has been sent, or once I know I have received a 
message, either I expect the receiver to respond or I know that the 
sender might expect a response. In both cases and directions, the trace 
of the communication contains a question/an order/a proposition and 
thus it produces a form of responsibility between sender and receiver. 
By following this line of reasoning, Ferraris develops his theory on 
(what he defines as) Derrida’s ‘anxious ontology’ (Ferraris 2011: 17): 
in other words, an ontology characterised by the human fear of being 
forgotten, of missing the traces of what has been, and which has 
notoriously translated into grammatology.
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Pole Three. Technology - Nomos. Against this background, the 
relationship between technology and normativity becomes clearer. The 
recording makes it possible for the norm to be read, seen, understood, 
received - thus, it is necessary for its existence. For it to exist, it must 
be inscribed (codified). Once traced down, once inscribed and codified, 
then, one cannot claim that it was impossibile to have access to that 
norm - thus the inscription makes it an obligation. As Derrida writes, 
we do not obey it because it is just or unjust, but because it is written 
down as a norm. 
This circular movement (from nomos to grammata/inscription, from 
grammata to technology, from technology to nomos and back) is the 
background movement that makes law enforceable: thus, the nature of 
law as law appears to be intrinsically connected to its materiality. The 
gap between the materiality and the value attributed to it (this différance, 
to say it in Derridean terms) produces what in physics is defined 
‘potential’: an unrealised ability, which could be realised or is about 
to be realised (but could also remain just a potential). This potential 
displaces all oppositional logics and opens a dynamic perspective on 
normativity, in which nomoi, grammata, codices as recording technologies 
constantly define each other. Actually, this circularity shows that the 
very sense of the law lies in its inscription: Derrida’s main thesis in the 
Mystical Foundation of Authority (1992: 6) is that the enforceability of 
law shows how ‘there is no such thing as law (droit) that doesn’t imply 
in itself, a priori, in the analytic structure of its concept, the possibility 
of being “enforced”, applied by force’. And what enforces the law is 
precisely its materiality. So it is very interesting that, decades later, 
and within the explosion of recording (just think of smartphones, the 
web, big data), a disciple of Derrida (Ferraris) engages in a philosophy 
of actuality starting from the normative force of new technologies - 
which, as he says, have the power to make us feel obliged like a formal 
norm written down on a text.
This is how his article on total mobilisation (Ferraris 2014) begins: 
It is the night between Saturday and Sunday, the night that is 
traditionally consecrated to rest. In the dead of night, I wake up. I 
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want to see what time it is and I obviously check it on the cell phone, 
which tells me that it is three o’ clock. But, at the same time, I notice 
that someone has sent me an email. I cannot resist the curiosity, or 
better the anxiety, (the mail concerns a matter of work), and that’s it: I 
read it and reply. I am suddenly working on Saturday night, no matter 
where I am. The Internet is an empire on which the sun never sets, 
and having a smartphone in your pocket means having the world in 
your hand, but it also automatically means being in the hands of the 
world: at all times a request can reach us, and at all times we will be 
responsible for dealing with it.
The possibility of recording makes it possible to realise something 
which was unbelievable until recently (communicating with a colleague 
who lives on the other side of the planet, as if she was there in front 
of us); yet, the technology that makes this communication possible 
produces a bond between those two subjects and potentially all the 
other subjects that could use similar instruments of mobilisation. Just 
like the double value of law as an authorised force (Gewalt) that always 
needs to be justified (Derrida 1992), the act of writing and recording has 
to do with justification, on the one hand, and simultaneously produces 
consequences, on the other hand. Similarly, the medium - the email, 
or chat, which is mainly characterised by recording - reproduces the 
double bind between dike and adikia, i.e. between what is just and 
what is unjust. 
The double movement between absence and presence is also the 
theme of the opening pages of Giorgio Agamben’s book The Fire 
and the Tale (2017: 1ff), where he engages with literary historigraphy 
starting from an old anecdote found in a book on Jewish mysticism. 
Here is what the story tells. There was, once, Baal Schem, the founder 
of Hasidism. Each time he had a difficult task to face and resolve, he 
would go to the woods, in a specific place; he would then light a fire 
and meditate in prayer, and what he had set out to perform was done 
(Agamben 2017: 1). A generation later, the Maggid of Meseritz had to 
face the same task: he went again to that specific place in the woods, 
saying ‘we can no longer light a fire, but we can pray’; and, again, what 
he had set out to perform was done and everything he wanted, finally 
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happened. Then, another generation passed, and Rabbi Moshe Leib of 
Sassov had to face a task. He said: ‘We can no longer light a fire, nor 
do we know the secret meditations belonging to the prayers, but we 
know the place in the woods, and that can be sufficient’. And in fact it 
was sufficient. But, then, another generation passed and Rabbi Israel 
of Rishin was asked to performed the task. He finally said that they 
could no longer light the fire, they could not speak the prayers, they 
did not know the place, but they could still tell the story of all that. 
And, again, it was sufficient. 
The short story talks about the function of literature and narrative: 
historically we have moved further from the sources of our knowledge, 
from the original sources of law. What remains of all the mysteries that 
are no longer traced is literature, narration, narratives and that - the 
Rabbi comments - can be enough. ‘We can tell the story of this’, is 
what the last Rabbi says: by saying so, he means exactly the opposite. 
‘All this’ is an undetermined sea of signs where all knowledge depends 
on the story. 
Derrida was obsessed with a similar loss of the fire, of the signs, 
and thus he suggested paying attention to all signs and to consider 
all the world within the text, the documents, and archives; Ferraris 
adds, to this, that grammatology has a cost. If traces remain, and 
if we make it possible for them to remain eternally and to be found 
anytime and anywhere, thus they become sources of obligation. Like 
the Platonic pharmakon, presence and absence are linked together and 
define each other. Interestingly, the allegory of the fire and the tale 
talks about oral and written culture, which again, as in all Derridean 
grammatology, suggests something relevant for legal discourse: that all 
normative culture should be reconsidered in light of the technological 
transformation we are experiencing. 
2  Materia of the nomoi
The double bind linking the presence and the absence of traces on 
technological devices invites a redefinition of what is ‘normative’. 
If there is no law without enforceability, and no applicability or 
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enforceability of the law without a justification of the use of force 
(which can only derive from an inscription), then the material life of 
norms is a fundative part of norms themselves. The constitution, or 
inscription, of a legal norm as law is a matter of différance - i.e., in 
Derridean terms, of the relation ‘between force and form, between force 
and signification, performative force, illocutionary or perlocutionary 
force, of persuasive and rhetorical force, of affirmation by signature’ 
(Derrida 1992: 7). For Derrida, the act of inscription is the origin of all 
meaning, persistence, and value: 
For me, it is always a question of differential force, of difference as 
difference of force, of force as différance (différance is a force differée-
différante), of the relation between force and form, between force and 
signification, performative force, illocutionary or perlocutionary force, 
of persuasive and rhetorical force, of affirmation by signature, but also 
and especially of all the paradoxical situations in which the greatest 
force and the greatest weakness strangely enough exchange places.
By linking dishomogeneous objects - force and form, presence and 
absence - and by showing their reciprocal coexistence, différance, as 
aforementioned, displaces all typically oppositional logic and makes 
it necessary to rethink the rigid categories that had led to thinking 
of ontology as the mere, solid, reality standing in front of us, and of 
epistemology as a transcendental dimension where concepts fluctuate 
without any hold on the world. 
Technology, this is another intuition that we owe to Ferraris (2018), 
connects these two dimensions - ontology and epistemology - and 
inhabits that differential space that for Derrida was constituted mainly 
by textuality and for Ferraris is constituted both by textuality and by 
the technological devices where signs, traces, texts, words are deposited. 
The recording is where the norm is present: it is written down and thus 
it exists and it remains valid through the sign. Its inscription constitutes 
its presence: it is there, and it is valid, because of its material definition 
through the recording - be it in a code (in the case of a law), or on an 
electronic device (in the case of data transmitted on informatic devices). 
The act of writing down the norm represents something that otherwise 
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would not exist. Normative language needs to be traced down, or it 
would be impossible to know or understand its content; the act of tracing 
down the content of the norm is, at the same time, an act of hiding the 
norm behind those words. This inscription, or recording, is necessary: 
without it, there would be only a fluctuating content of a norm that 
does not exist outside of the mind of the person who has imagined it. 
As Peter Goodrich noted in Languages of Law, our memory is 
narrational, and:
[T]he law maps that narrative in a story of origins or of the sources 
from which the law comes, precedent being nothing other than the 
cartography of that elastic temporal expanse between the beginning 
and end of a story, between the emergence and the conclusion, between 
the exordium and the peroration (1990: 36). 
If we try to link this original drive, or need, for origins, to the 
arché that justifies and explains the reasons of everything, then the 
fundamental importance played by technology today emerges even 
more quickly. How messages are transmitted, deposited, found: all the 
material life of the legal files, already described in the wonderful work 
of Cornelia Vismann, is now expanding and proliferating. If, on the 
one hand, logic gives order and structure to legal narrative, legal norms 
on the other hand need a justification to be legitimated. Goodrich 
writes (1990: 39) ‘the connective principle, already adverted to, is not, 
however, simply one of visual recollection or remembering. It is more 
than that; it relies upon a first cause, an origin whose presence is to be 
traced throughout the argument.’ The questions that emerge concern the 
material life of laws and obligations - that could emerge, for instance, 
from a tweet: indeed, a tweet creates a link between one person and 
a community, and it thus constitutes a whole world of expectations, 
responsibilities, questions and answers. Again, it is Goodrich who, 
while discussing the lingustic roots of the common law, claimed that 
jurists should pay more attention to: 
[H]ow are these texts produced, where are these texts kept, by whom 
are they used, how do they move or circulate, who receives them, 
who interprets them, who would understand them, whose office is 
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it to understand and to send on that understanding, to transmit that 
custody? (Goodrich 1990: 113). 
Bringing legal theory back to the technologies of law is now 
recognised as a necessary gesture by many legal scholars. The issue 
that we must consider is the technology or mode of production of 
law, or more generally of norms. Such a grammatological - or, today, 
documedia - analysis of law touches upon legal rhetoric as well, this 
last understood not only as a mechanism to win a case, but also as an 
ars, a tèchne, a know-how: in its original meaning, tèchne meant both 
knowledge (epistemology) and the art of making, of being in the world 
(which relates to ontology). That is exactly where technology stands: in 
between those two dimensions. The technology of the law is memory, 
as archives and files show: 
[L]egal writing was a ritual system of inscriptions. The text was 
necessarily true; […] It was a language not of speech but of memory, of 
memorials and of monuments addressed not so much to any immediate 
audience as to posterity and to God’ (Goodrich 1990: 139).
A  Decentralized, Autonomous, Impersonal. New 
Technologies of Normativity
In her book Files (2008) Corniela Vismann showed how files (Akten) 
are the basic variables in the universes of writing and of the law: they 
proliferate, they mushroom. Files are recording devices that register 
everything in the medium of writing, also that which is not writing:
Files are comprehensive recording devices that register everything in 
the medium of writing, even that which is not writing. They register 
events, voices, gestures, and appearances. It is not until the twentieth 
century, when competition arises in the shape of the analog recording 
of events by technological media, that the inaccuracy of written files 
becomes apparent. From then on, these new technologies set the 
standard for recording accuracy and promote the linguistic analysis 
of the loss that accompanies the conversion of speech into files. It is 
not until linguistic pragmatics provides the appropriate framework 
(Vismann 2008: 10).
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This was before the big data, and before the use of artificial 
intelligence in legal practice: Vismann already recognized the diffuse 
ignorance of legal scholars towards the sources and the instruments 
of the practices at the core of their work. As if a reflection on the tools 
was intellectually less exciting than a reflection on the concepts and 
on the juridical issues. The current technological revolution has even 
amplified the presence of files of all sorts; following Ferraris,  we could 
distinguish between files or documents in a strong sense - and files 
or documents in a weak sense. In a strong sense, a file contains the 
intentions of one or more subjects. For instance, a contract is a file in a 
strong sense. The trace of an event, or the sign of a communication, is a 
document or file in a weak sense (according to Ferraris’ distinction).  
Vismann argued for a similar distinction:
Documents or certificates differ conspicuously from records by their 
representative use of writing. They are not designed for any particular 
administrative use; rather, they are made to impress. Their letters are 
signs of power; their very appearance represents the authority of the 
issuer. The layout of a document is a ‘gesture of power’. Disregarding 
all aesthetic concerns related to typeface, page format, and placement 
of letters, it is the prestigiousness of the signs alone that determines 
the size and arrangement of the letters on a document (2008: 72). 
Vismann focuses on the ambivalent nature of the German term 
‘Akten’, which indicates both the written text, and whatever inscribed 
trace - and the devices to archive the texts: Akten are both the single 
instances (of documents, traces, etc) and the spaces of their collection 
as Akten. I shall summarise the main transformations occuring in the 
present time in three main points/characteristics: i. decentralisation 
and distribution of archives (and thus of documents and of the traces 
within); ii. absence of state authority, autonomy; iii. unmodifiable 
nature of the traces, since they also proliferate from each other and do 
not derive (or not always) from the action of a subject.  
As to i. (decentralisation and distribution), registers - for instance 
those that work through blockchains - have copies of the data: this 
means that nobody can say that he or she has the exclusive and unique 
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copy of a document, since the archive is everywhere and anyone who 
has access to it. In a certain way, contemporary archives have realised 
the fantasy represented in Italo Calvino’s The memory of the world, a 
short story written in 1963, in which all the information about each 
individual, place, city, event, relationship was contained within one, 
gigantic, universal archive (interestingly enough, by the way, the 
narrator says in a dialogue that the gigantic and universal archive had 
been built because humanity was afraid to be forgotten, a fear familiar 
to Derrida’s obsession with textuality). We currently have the equivalent 
of many NSA Towers, all distributed around the world into archives 
that are apparently immaterial (but that consist of infinite traces, that 
produce more and new traces). 
As to ii. (autonomy and absence of authority), a good exemplification 
is offered by blockchains (the intrument used for the bitcoin monetary 
circuits): there is no subject to verify the operation, but an algorythm 
controls and calculates all the operations of the transaction. There is 
no authority to check the transactions, which appear to be much more 
accessible by everyone, everywhere, anytime. 
As to iii. (traces cannot be easily modified), each transaction made 
through these distributed registers (such as blockchains) can only be 
modified by a counter-operation. Data, once inscribed, gain a life of 
their own. 
The philosophical concept of documediality ties in well with 
Vismann’s work in particular because it invites a reflection on the 
apparent antinomy between the norms of law as classically defined 
and the norms understood as legal ‘remediation’. The circulation of law 
changes as well with the current technological revolution, showing a 
certain archetypical (virtual) nomos, counterposed to the confines of the 
traditional archive or library. The opposition invites to recall Vismann’s 
example of lead rolls whose principal significance was their gravity, 
their weight, their perdurance, the fact that something was there and 
defined a space, a confinement in the library or archive, currently 
counterposed to the free play, evanescence and unbearable lightness 
of clips and tweets and hastags. 
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In conclusion, as Mark Antaki rightly recalls in his dialogue with 
Richard Janda, Hannah Arendt has developed an idea of a ‘negative 
solidarity’ as a characteristic of humanity, forged by technology and 
tied to humanity’s capacity to destroy itself. And to destroy itself by 
looking, potentially, for a better living, or for an easier one. Through 
these elaborations on Derrida and Ferraris, hopefully, the ambivalence 
of technology has re-emerged as some sort of fil rouge that has 
accompanied human history since antiquity. The artificial normativity 
of the law, as a matter of fact, grows parallel to the other systems of 
laws, first of all those of the world outside and before the law. On top 
of such an already complex normative universe, norms - in order to be 
enforceable and to be valid - need to be inscribed. And this explosion of 
inscription has transformed the Panopticon into a system of reciprocal 
observation of everyone, everywhere, anytime. Technology preserves 
and deposits traces on top of an already complicated thread of natural 
norms and social norms. 
Notes
1. See Maurizio Ferraris’ chapter in the present volume for specific aspects 
of the current technological transformation, in order to understand what 
he means when referring to the current ontological and epistemological 
revolution. 
2. In the present volume: Heretical Archives: pp. 53 ff.
3. In the present volume: pp. 21 ff.
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